Chapter II

THE NATIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC TASKS

The Political Report of the Party's Eighth Regional Con­gress has comprehensively, precisely and deeply tackled the na­tional and democratic tasks.

It has dealt with political independence, defining in a pre­cise manner the necessary conditions for establishing it in Iraq and the countries of the Third World. It has also dwelt upon eco­nomic independence affirming the need to achieve it as a basic ground for guarding and consolidating political independence. Further, it has referred to the issues of the National Front and democratic process in the country after the 17-30 July, 1968 Re­volution. In all these vital fields, the Eighth Regional Congress has defined certain objectives and tasks for the next phase.

What is the nature of the course the Revolution had taken between the Eighth Regional Congress and the Ninth in the field of discharging the national and democratic objectives? What are the new developments in this field? What objectives and tasks were achieved among those defined by the Eighth Congress? What are those which were not achieved and why?

 

1 - Political Independence

The 17-30 July, 1968 Revolution has engaged in a difficult and complex battle along the path of performing the tasks of po­litical independence. Iraq was not under colonial rule. Nor was it under any official or public foreign influence. It has no fo­reign bases either. Yes, national independence was fragile and vulnerable to dangers. Before the Revolution, espionage rings had so cancerously spread over the country that it had become an open place for the activities of Zionist, colonialist and Ira­nian intelligence services as well as of those of a number of other foreign countries. Iraq was also acutely lacking in the essential requirements for the protection of its political independence, such as strong central government, economic independence, ba­lanced international relations and other factors which guard in­dependence and make it a living and strong reality.

As the Political Report of the Eighth Regional Congress in­ferred, the Party managed to clear away all the conditions which had been posing a threat to political independence in the country, thanks to its comprehensive national view and firm re­volutionary will. The espionage rings were liquidated. No lon­ger does this issue poses a political threat. Rather, it has become a normal technical issue which competent organs can handle. A strong central government was established. In 1974, the Revo­lution launched a decisive battle against the forces of reactiona­ry insurgency in the north of the country, totally defeating them. And in March 1975, the central government's control was com­prehensively forced, for the first time since 1961, on that part of the country.

 

The past phase witnessed certain progress in the national awareness and the experience of the competent organs in guard­ing the basic structure of the state and its secrets against attempts at infiltration and penetration. Intensive stress was laid on spreading the national and socialist culture and making it the prevailing culture in the country whether in education or infor­mation or culture. Despite the fact that good progress was made in this respect, the Party still has to continue this course with yet more interest and vigor with a view to making the national and socialist culture and prevailing aspect in all fields, so as to bring man up in a nationalist and socialist manner and protect him from all harmful effects of foreign cultures. The Party has, however, to constantly maintain its stance of creative interac­tion with useful foreign cultures and experiments.

 

In the past phase, the Party's experience had been enriched through the battle of national independence. The Party had discovered that this question is not confined to political indepen­dence which was decisively achieved, but rather is closely link­ed to the preservation of the free national will and the mainte­nance of all its political, economic, military and other require­ments, especially in shouldering the great and complex national tasks on local and Arab levels. The most prominent of these re­quirements are:

First: Establishing balanced international relations with va­rious forces in the world, which are closely linked to the natio­nal interests on local and Arab levels. Failure to perform this task brings the country concerned, in result rather than in in­tentions, into the orbit of one of the big powers or into that of a group of states. In his address to Iraqi Ambassadors in 1975, published in «Iraq and International Relations», Comrade Sad­dam Hussein confirmed this point and outlined sound solutions for it. He stressed the need to diversify Iraq's foreign relations, especially with the power centers of the world and with those growing ones so as to enhance the free national will on one hand, and provide better chances for meeting national needs at both local and Arab levels on the other.

Second: The diversification of armament sources. This im­portant aspect in enhancing political independence and free na­tional will for all states is of great importance and sensitivity for Iraq, given its special conditions and the nature of its national tasks.

For many years before the Revolution, Iraq's arms supplies had been coming from one source, the Soviet Union. In gene­ral, the Soviet Union has cooperated well with Iraq in this re­gard. The Revolution has succeeded in building up strong arm­ed forces with good equipment and the most modern arms.

 

However, out of its profound view of national independence, the Revolution has discovered through experience that re­liance on one source for armaments puts shackles on national will, especially when the country has to engage in great military battles for national reasons. In such a case, military requirements can be satisfied only to a certain extent from the source of its armament.

 

Proceeding from its strategic appraisal, the Leadership was determined to follow a planned and constant policy to diversify the sources of armament. Hence, it has developed military rela­tions with other socialist countries and with Yugoslavia. It has established extensive relations with France in the field of mili­tary supplies of arms and equipment. The Revolution has also established armament relations with other countries in Europe and in other areas.

 

This policy has paid off remarkably well during the battle with the Iranian enemy. After we were forced to decisively and comprehensively confront the Iranian enemy, the Soviet Union has totally stopped all military supplies to Iraq. However, it has been possible to meet the needs of the battle in a remarkable and comprehensive manner, thanks to the Leadership's proper policy of constantly maintaining a large reserve of military equipment, diversifying the armament sources and adopting new and daring formulas in satisfying our military needs.

 

Despite this break in supplies, which had lasted for a con­siderable time, the Iraqi armed forces have remained very po­werful, with most of its needs met. In fact, its armament con­ditions have even improved on those of pre-war times in certain fields.

The policy of diversifying the sources of armament consti­tutes today one central component of the Revolution's policy in enhancing political independence and consolidating free natio­nal will.

 

Third: The building-up of military industry - which is re­lated to the second factor above. To build up such an industry is a necessary prerequisite for consolidating national indepen­dence and free national will. If it is not possible to manufacture all that our armed forces need, it is quite possible, even neces­sary, to provide as much as possible of such needs through na­tional industry.

 

Emphasis was given to certain parts of this industrialization process, given the fact that certain arms are subject to mono­poly. This was done within certain calculations.

The Revolution has laid considerable stress on this issue. Good progress has been made; and the conditions of the battle against the Iranian enemy have been great incentives for such progress.

 

Fourth: Another question closely and sensitively related to national independence, is that of the Iranians living in Iraq, some of whom have acquired Iraqi nationality.

Many factors have led to the illegal growth of a large Ira­nian community in Iraq. Among these are Iraq's well-known historical conditions, its nearness to Iran, the Persian occupa­tion of Iraq in the dark ages following the fall of the Abbasid Empire, the presence of holy shrines in Iraq, and the lack of a strong central government during the Ottoman era. Others are the weakness of the Iraqi government established after 1920 and its lack of clear laws and rules defining citizenship and foreig­ners' residence; the odd conditions following the July 1958 Re­volution and the control by many Shu'ubite (Anti-Arab) ele­ments of certain sensitive State organs; and the fragile aspect and corruption of the government during the Arif regime.

A considerable number of the members of this community acquired Iraqi nationality with legal and legitimate means some­times and with illegal and illegitimate means most of the time.

 

The Iraqi people are known for its tolerance. Besides its de­cisive Arab and Islamic character, Iraq throughout its history, has embraced many ethnic and religious minorities which lived in peace and fraternity so long as the country was under normal conditions and with Iraqi and Arab sovereignty.

 

These principles and practices were firmly established after the assumption of power by the Arab Baath Socialist Party on 17-30 July 1968. As a nationalist and human Party, it has reject­ed ever since its founding all forms and practices of Shu'ubism (anti-Arabism) and racism.

It believes in fraternal relations among ethnic and religious communities living in the Arab lands, and in the principles of fraternal relations among nations and peoples of the world.

 

However, the bitter fact confirmed through long historical experience is that the majority of Iranians who settled in Iraq and enjoyed for decades or even centuries its riches and its peo­ple's brotherly treatment - some of them were treated as full ci­tizens with all rights and privileges after they had acquired Ira-qui nationality - have harbored spiteful racist feelings against Iraq and the Arab nation. They had not shown any loyalty to the soil on which they had lived or to the homeland whose na­tionality they had acquired. Rather, they retained their loyalty to and connections with Iran, serving its conspiratorial and ex­pansionist plans against Iraq and the Arab nation, regardless of the nature of the regime in Iran.

 

It is quite a mistake to think that this aspect has arisen after the assumption of power in Iran by Khomeini. It had been there during the Qadjari era when Iraq was under Ottoman control, and had continued during the regime of Riza Pahlavi and his son Mohammed after Iraq had achieved its superficial indepen­dence during the Royal regime. It had also continued during the regimes of Qassim and Arif.

 

The same aspect has continued after the July 17-30 Revolu­tion. When, in April 1969, the Shah renounced the 1937 agree­ment - thus posing a threat to the sovereignty of Iraq over the Shatt-al-Arab - conspired against Iraq's revolutionary govern­ment, and extended aid to Barzani's gang, the Iranians resident in Iraq, some of them with Iraqi nationality, had worked as a fifth column inside Iraqi society. Indeed, they were the cause of the most disruptive campaigns of rumors in this society. It was they who were providing Iranian intelligence, and through that the imperialist and Zionist intelligence, with information on Iraq's economy and strategic positions, its armed forces' condi­tions, and all other information needed by Iranian intelligence and its intelligence allies.

 

Some members of this community had taken part in the Shah-sponsored reactionary conspiracy of 1970 which was re­ferred to in the Political Report of the Eighth Regional Con­gress. After the Revolution, they were allies of Barazani's clique inside Iraq.

When the dispute with the Shah of Iran grew more acute, this fifth column tried to confront the Revolution openly and escalated its conspiratorial activity. As a punitive measure, the Revolution deported a few thousands of Iranian residents in Iraq to Iran with a view to ridding the country of their evil and conspiracies.

This measure applied towards the end of 1971 and after­wards, was also a punishment for those who had committed treason against the land which has given them shelter for many centuries.

 

Moreover, this step was a form of relative deterrence for those elements. The remainder of the Iranian community and those loyal to Iran, among the ones with Iraqi nationality gave in to the fait accompli after they realized that the Revolution was determined to use its iron fist against them, and that all their attempts to undermine that decision - which many parties, in­cluding the Communist Party, had tried to obstruct or invalidate - had failed; and when the Revolution successfully resisted the campaigns of distortion staged by the Shah's regime and its friends in the region and abroad against this measure.

After Khomeini's regime had assumed power in Iran and re­vealed its evil intentions against Iraq and after its plan to in­vade Iraq and impose Persian hegemony over it had become clear, this question had surfaced again in a more serious manner than ever.

The Iranian residents in Iraq - some of whom had Iraqi nationality - who were loyal to the Shah's regime and were serving its plans, had at once shifted their loyalty to Khomeini and his regime, not because they were necessarily in agreement with its ideology or policy, but rather because of their racist hatred of Iraq and the Arab nation.

 

Indeed, those have again formed a fifth column which was very active in serving Khomeini's regime and in staging internal subversion, thus becoming the largest medium where the pup­pet Da'wa Party has grown, and where its members have taken refuge and got financial aid and facilities for their subversive and murderous acts. Some Iranians who had recently acquired Iraqi nationality had even directly taken part in murders and explo­sions carried out against the public, Party members and State organizations.

Hence, it was necessary to take a decisive attitude towards the question of an Iranian presence in Iraq, which, in that phase, and more than ever before, had become very sensitive and closely connected with national independence and security and with the basic interests of the people and the country. Thus, the Revolution's bodies took action to deport those elements from the homeland, as well as punitive measures against them because of their conspiratorial and treacherous attitude towards Iraq.

 

This correct national stance soon paid off. Within a few weeks, ill-intentioned rumors and aspects of confusion which they had spread against Iraq, to the advantage of the Iranian regime, sharply dwindled.

The Iranian radio and intelligence services were no longer able to have such sources of information as they had formerly. The psychological conditions in many Iraqi areas of whose po­pulation those had made an important part were no longer up­set. Market conditions had become normal and the monopoly and lack of goods and price fluctuations diminished, because of the departure of those Iranian residents who had long occupied an important place in the commercial bourgeois in Iraq, con­trolling essential links in its trade.

 

This measure has, in fact saved Iraq from a serious cancer. In removing this cancer, the Revolution further enhanced the na­tional independence and will. It was no longer possible thereaf­ter to exploit the presence of Iranians in Iraq to the advantage of the Iranian regime's conspiratorial and expansionist plans which, regardless of their covers are connected with the Zionist and colonialist plans which are aimed at undermining Arab na­tionalism and the independent Arab policy, fragmenting the Arab nation and imposing hegemony over its land and will. It has become clear to all, that it is no longer possible to use this or any other similar issue against Iraq and its sovereignty and unity.

The Revolution led by the Party profoundly adheres to hu­man principles in which it believes. The treacherous stance of the Iranian community in Iraq and of some of its members with Iraqi nationality has not and will not change this policy.

All Iraqis, including those of foreign origins, have their chances to be true Iraqi citizens with all rights and duties of ci­tizenship in accordance with the laws in force. They will be al­ways the object of love and care by Iraq and its revolutionary government so long as they adhere to their Iraqi identity and re­main sincerely committed to their homeland, Iraq.

However, it should be clear that anyone of non-Iraqi origin will be dealt with in exactly the same manner as were those trea­cherous Iranians if he stands against the homeland, which has given him nationality and care.

 

The Revolution will never allow the return of the pheno­menon of resident Iranians in Iraq and the methods they used to stab the Iraqi homeland and people in the back.

The Iraqi homeland is for all Iraqis and the Iraqi people is one solid and coherent body absolutely and permanently attach­ed to Iraq.

The Iraqi nationality is the official identity of Iraqi citizen­ship. It is an identity of honor and a pledge of service to Iraq, loyalty to its soil, full and absolute assimilation in its history, destiny and national aspirations. It is not a cover or a means to undermine these principles and values.

 

2 - Economic Independence

The experiment made by the 17-30 July, 1968 Revolution led by the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party in the field of economic independence is a model and pioneering experiment in the Third World.

The Party was aware of all aspects of economic independence. These complex and delicate aspects were tackled in the Eighth Regional Congress report and many other Party documents and talks by Comrade Saddam Hussein. All the dangers besetting economic independence were clearly defined as well as the way to confront them with a view to enhancing independence and making it an established fact.

In this respect, oil nationalization was the decisive battle be­tween the Revolution and the colonialist and monopolistic for­ces. With its decisive and comprehensive success, the Revolu­tion has taken Iraq from the age of economic subservience to co­lonialist and monopolistic powers and of being directly exposed to their negative influence, to the age of economic independence which has become, as we have said, a real and concrete fact, thanks to the policies of the Party and Revolution before and after the nationalization battle.

 

Upon the meeting of the Eighth Regional Congress, the Re­volution had achieved 85 per cent of the process of oil nationalization. The shares of Britain and France in the Basra Petro­leum Company were not yet nationalized. In accordance with the Eighth Regional Congress's call for consolidating «full so­vereignty over our prime national wealth, oil, in all aspects* it was decided on December 8, 1975 to nationalize the shares of these two states. Earlier, the share of Holland was nationalized on October 10, 1973; and the share of Portugal on December 20, 1973. Thus, all Iraqi oil, together with all its branches and activities, has become fully nationalized.

 

In accordance with the instructions of the Eighth Regional Congress, the government has achieved the construction of projects of strategic nature such as the strategic pipeline, Al-Bakr off-shore terminal, the trans-Turkey oil pipeline and other great projects which contribute to consolidating our economic independence and ensures a great freedom for Iraq to deal with its oil wealth away from attempts at blackmail and exploitation, whether by the Syrian regime, or other countries in the region, or colonialist and monopolistic powers. Upon Comrade Saddam Hussein's direct instructions, attention was drawn at an earlier stage to the necessity of diversifying Iraq's production of oil and energy so as to avoid any blockade that may be imposed by in­ternational powers against us, whether in terms of quantity of exports or pricing. Iraq has been also distinguished as the big­gest national marketing body in the Third World.

 

Iraq's oil policy whether in its direct dealings with states or through the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) or the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) has been a model of real national policy which gives first priority to national interests while well under­standing the requirements of international cooperation on sound and balanced bases.

 

In recent years, despite attempts by colonialist powers and certain hostile states in the region, Iraq's responsible role in in­ternational oil policy has been greatly enhanced.

As for foreign trade and its relation with the issues of eco­nomic independence which were tackled by the Political Report of the Eighth Regional Congress, the Revolution has adopted a balanced policy. It has established trade relations with friendly states and with other ones with which our dealings are advan­tageous. Our commercial relations were linked to the stance of these states towards our national cause and towards the ques­tion of oil marketing. Hence, Iraq has warded off any attempt at linking its economy with any foreign bloc or axis. Indeed, Iraq acts freely in the commercial field, thus maintaining its full economic independence.

 

Iraq has adopted the same principles in implementing the comprehensive development plan. To implement a comprehen­sive and ambitious development plan requires help from fo­reign companies, firms and expertise. Need also has arisen for foreign workforce. The Leadership of Party and Revolution has earnestly sought to diversify dealings with other states in this field in order that the development plan should not be tied to any particular foreign party as this would put shackles on our free national will and independence. However, particular atten­tion was paid to the quality of projects implementation, the speed of implementation which is very important, and prices.

 

The Leadership has always given opportunities to foreign companies, firms and states within a political perspective, per­taining to the protection of the national independence and will from any form of irresponsible action of influence, and to re­lating these opportunities to the stance of the relevant states to­wards our national causes on the local as well as the Arab levels.

This policy has paid off remarkably well during the war against the Iranian enemy. Iraq's full economic independence, its flexibility and freedom in making economic dealings with all countries of the world and its sound policy of maintaining re­serves for emergencies have been a basic factor in the success of our battle with the Iranian enemy. Further, these aspects have gained the Iraqi experiment the appreciation of the whole world. Despite the conditions of war, the Iraqi economy remained fully independent and prosperous; and the development plan in its main parts has proceeded as planned by the Leadership.

The course of consolidating economic independence should continue in the same spirit and with the same methods used by the Revolution during the past phase. The country's continuing progress in all fields, the successful implementation of the de­velopment plan and the increase and development of national in­dustrial and agricultural production —all these factors enhance economic and political independence and consolidate Iraq's role in nationalist issues and in international community.

 

3 - The Kurdish Question

When the Eighth Regional Congress was held, the colonia­list and reactionary insurgency staged by Mustafa Barazani's gang had not yet started. However, there were clear indications that this gang was determined to conspire against the Revolution and national unity and to trigger off an insurgency. The Eighth Re­gional Congress has remarkably tackled the Kurdish question in principled and political terms, defining precisely the stance of the Party and Revolution towards this question, which occupies a very high place among national causes tackled by the Revolu­tion in a highly principled manner and with a high degree of precision.

 

The Congress confirmed that the commitment of the Party and Revolution to the Declaration of March 11, 1970 and to im­plementing all its articles, is a constant political and principled com­mitment on which there is no going back, whatever the condi­tions may be.

It has also confirmed that this did not mean any commit­ment towards the leadership of the Kurdish Democratic Party (Barazani group) pointing out that the range of cooperation with this leadership would be defined in the light of its attitude to­wards the Party and Revolution and the March 11 Declaration as well as in the light of its fulfillment of its commitments as de­fined by the Declaration and its clear adherence to the national policy and unity.

 

The Congress has also confirmed that commitment to the March Declaration and the peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish question "must not lead us to underrate suspect ac­tivities, encouraged by imperialists by way of puppet and reac­tionary groups in the Kurdish area, with the aim of disrupting national unity, destabilizing the Autonomy Region and perpe­tuating secession in defiance of the country's progressive and de­mocratic evolution."1

In two months after the end of the Eighth Regional Con­gress meetings, and on the very date for the implementation of autonomy in accordance with the 1970 March Declaration, the Revolution Command Council announced on March 11, 1974 the Autonomy Law for Kurdistan region.

This law paved the way for establishing the autonomy bo­dies, the Executive and Legislative Councils, which ensure the exercise by the Kurdish people of its legitimate rights within the national unity.

 

However, Mullah Mustafa Barazani’s group refused to coope­rate with the Revolution leadership and took hostile attitudes to­wards the national unity and the Revolution. It had also launch­ed an open insurgency on a very large scale. To stage an insur­gency against the Revolution was not a stance solely related to Barazani's group, but also an essential part of the Zionist, impe­rialist and reactionary conspiracy against the Revolution. Zio­nism and American imperialism had encouraged Mustafa Barazani to launch an insurgency and asked the Shah of Iran to sup­port him on a large-scale so as to stab and weaken the Revolu­tion. This was viewed as a step towards overthrowing or sub­jecting it to the American imperialist plan which the United States had embarked on implementing on a large-scale in the region especially after the October 1973 war and the beginning of the course of capitulationism settlement which later reached the Camp David stage.

 

The battle against the reactionary insurgency and the Zio­nist, imperialist and reactionary forces which stood behind it, was so valiant that it will be proudly recorded in the history of national struggle. Many of its facts were not publicized or known on the local, national (Arab) and international levels. The Re­volution had then chosen not to largely publicize its handling of the battle because it was an extremely delicate and sensitive mat­ter as an internal issue on the face of it.

 

The Revolution was trying every possible means to reduce the volume of intervention in this issue by imperialist forces and hostile elements inside the country as well as hostile forces in the region.

The decisive success made by the Revolution in this valiant battle which lasted for a whole year was based on solid and cor­rect bases.

The first aspect of the Revolution's approach to the battle against the insurgency was to strike a balance with precision and awareness between the need to struggle through all legitimate means against the insurgency and the full principled commit­ment to the Autonomy Law and the legitimate rights of our Kur­dish people exactly as the Eighth Regional Congress had defined it.  

In this respect Comrade Saddam Hussein said:

"Before to March 11, 1970, we had stated that if the Kur­dish question was dealt with through a purely military approach, we would be the losers, even if the last trench of the enemy for­ces in the mountains had been defeated. But if the question was approached in a correctly principled and political manner, we would win the battle even if our enemies were numerous. This prediction has been justified in the defeat of a renegade faction which involved more than a purely military solution. The Iraqi army, despite its valiant role, would not have been able to per­form effectively if it had not been defending the political prin­ciples and aims drawn up by the political leadership. Principles were responsible for the defeat of Mullah Mustafa Barazani and his renegade faction. The essence of these principles is that the problems of all our people, be they in Kurdistan, in Basra, or simply our own, should be dealt with in exactly the same spirit"2.

 

The second aspect of the Revolution's approach to fighting the insurgency lay in the Revolution's concern to distinguish, in principled and practical terms, between the Kurdish citizens and the insurgents. In such complex conditions as those of the in­surgency it was quite possible to expect some sort of entanglement between the reactionary forces of insurgency and the Kur­dish people who were liable to be influenced by the reactionary insurgents' distortions or whose places of residence fell within the area of the insurgents' activity. Dealing with these Kurdish citizens as part of the Iraqi people and the Revolution's follo­wers, the Revolution had sought, by every possible means, to win them over to its fold.

"In the discussions of the Higher Committee for North Affairs attended by some leading comrades, during which, a review of the combat operations took place, we asked: "Where does our greatest victory up to the present lie?" Some said that the greatest victory was the crossing of the Ali Beg Pass 3, in accor­dance with the well-known plan. But we disagreed. The grea­test victory was that, up to the present, no soldier had fired at any individual in the opposite trench when the latter had ex­hausted his ammunition and raised his hands in surrender. The greatest victory was that no single woman had been raped dur­ing the fighting. There was no repetition of past plunders. Des­pite the bloodshed, the surrendering insurgents were invited to eat at the same dish with the soldiers, as if nothing had happe­ned. This is the real victory. The unity of Iraq is still strong in the hearts of the Kurds fighting in the opposite trenches, as well as in the hearts of the Kurds and Arabs fighting in the armed forces. So long as the mentality and psychology of unity pre­vail, this is the greatest victory."4

 

The battle has seen remarkable aspects of national relations between the Armed Forces fighters and the Party members on one hand and the Kurdish people on the other. The Kurdish ci­tizens were abandoning the insurgency and joining the Revolu­tion. The same aspect characterized relations with the popula­tion of the areas liberated by the Revolution's forces from the despotic control of the reactionary insurgency and its evil practices.

 

This principled national stance has created a good psychological atmosphere to heal the bleeding wounds caused by the large-scale and lengthy insurgency as well as by the abnormal conditions previously prevailing in the region.

 

The Kurdish people have felt through actual experience and the most delicate and difficult conditions that Iraq's Leadership is a truly a national one which deal with all citizens on the basis of equality and affection. They have also felt the difference be­tween the national and principled characteristics and the mora­lity of the Party on one hand, and the hireling nature of the in­surgency leadership, its lack of morality and its despotic and evil practices on the other.

 

The battle against the insurgency of Mustafa Barazani’s group was not merely a successful military campaign but rather a com­prehensive, political, military, psychological and economic cam­paign with local aspects as well as those related to the condi­tions in the region and the stance of its various states.

 

It has also its international aspects. Therefore the strategy of the battle, its conduct and its daily tactics were a decisive fac­tor in deciding its success.

Comrade Saddam Hussein himself as Chairman of the High­est Committee for North Affairs has laid down the strategy of fighting the insurgency and defined its daily tactics on the mi­litary, political, economic, psychological and social levels. He prepared a comprehensive report incorporating all aspects of this strategy. The report was approved by the Party's Regional Com­mand as a basic guide in this respect.

 

The first essential aspect of this strategy was not to put off the date of autonomy implementation. Barazani’s group had ear­lier proposed to extend the duration of March 1970 Declaration to five years on the pretext that there was a need for completing the dialogue, which meant a postponement of the implementa­tion of the autonomy to March 1975.

 

The Communist Party supported this proposal which was also welcomed by many circles. However, the Leadership, in view of Comrade Saddam Hussein's report, has rejected this proposal and confirmed the need that the Revolution should ful­fill its promise by putting autonomy into effect on its very date, March 11, 1974. Hence, it has foiled a plan aimed at maintaining the state of confusion and chaos in the northern part of the country as well as linking the insurgency with the attempts which were under way at the time to destabilize the whole re­gion. In a year after this insurgency, the situation in Lebanon exploded. But then the Revolution had already defeated the in­surgency thus averting any possibility of linking it to the cons­piracies aimed at the region and to their previously made timings.

 

The second essential aspect of the strategy adopted by the Leadership -through the Highest Committee - was to avoid traditional methods in confronting the insurgency on all levels, and particularly the military one.

The leadership of the insurgency had a long experience of lacing the Iraqi Armed Forces. One mistaken consideration held by this leadership was that it could wage a lengthy war against conventional armed forces which use conventional military me­thods. Through such a means, it thought that it could realize the aim of insurgency, namely to create a state of attrition connec­ted with the conspiracy to overthrow the Revolution or to sub­ject it to colonialist and foreign plans and influences.

 

The Leadership was aware of this fact. Hence, under direct, sometimes indirect instructions from Comrade Saddam Hussein new plans were devised from which the main lines of successful military operations were derived. New methods of combat were .applied - which surprised the insurgents, confused their plans and inflicted heavy losses on them.

 

A great effort was made in this regard, for it was not easy lo change fighting methods in the army after long years of ap­plication. The young Ba'athist officers have made a prominent contribution to the battle against the insurgency. They have also gained excellent experience in combat and command, especially considering that they faced, in this battle, the most modern American weapons which were pouring in to the insurgents through the Shah's regime.

 

The Iraqi Armed Forces have valiantly and efficiently fought, proving once again that they are worthy of shouldering the res­ponsibility of defending the sovereignty and unity of the homeland. These battles have enriched these forces’ expertise and efficiency despite the fact that they had delayed their training programs which were set for turning the Iraqi army into a big and modern army.

It was a difficult and hard battle in which the Armed forces sustained a number of casualties that exceeded 16,000, marty­red and wounded, while the total figure of casualties among mi­litary men and civilians was about 60,000, martyred, killed and wounded.

 

The Iraqi people has paid a costly price in its own sons' blood to uproot a serious schism aimed at weakening and tear­ing Iraq apart as well as obstructing its forward move towards full freedom, power and progress. Surfacing in the following years was the great difference between the conditions to wind) certain forces sought to drag Iraq through the insurgency and the conditions to which the Revolution led by the Party had brought Iraq. The unified, powerful and prosperous Iraq which is playing a prominent role on the Arab and international levels is the outcome of the great successes achieved by the Revolution, in the forefront of which is that decisive battle against the reactionary insurgency backed by Zionism, imperialism .and reactionary forces.

 

By defeating the reactionary insurgency, the Revolution managed to implement the ingredients of democratic settlement of the Kurdish question. The Autonomy bodies were founded and firmly established; stability and security in the north prevailed; and the development process covered all the parts, the region after long years during which it had lagged behind in this field in comparison with other areas in Iraq.

 

The Revolution had allocated large funds for the reconstruc­tion and development of the Autonomy Region. Industries were introduced, roads were paved, schools and hospitals were built, tourist facilities were developed in recent years, and the Party's re­lation with the Kurdish people was cemented. Hence, defeat was the lot of all attempts made by the reactionary renegade group and the Communist Party to isolate these people from the Arab Baath Socialist Party on the pretext that it is a nationalist Arab Party which cannot represent the interests of the Kurdish peo­ple and express their aspirations. These people have felt in a lively way and through deep experience and critical circumstances that the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party is the vanguard national party round which they should rally so as to maintain their interests and realize their legitimate aspirations. Hence, the Party's organization has spread on a large scale among the Kurdish people.

 

The Party's Eleventh National Congress has endorsed an ex­tremely important document defining the Party's attitude to­wards ethnic groups and minorities in the Arab homeland. This document, published on April 19, 1979 asserted that "The Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party is the vanguard Party which represents all the people living in the Arab homeland, irrespective of their na­tional languages and characteristics. It is the sincere, fighting and firm defender of their cause, as well as being their leader along the path of freedom and unified society in the Arab homeland."

We can confirm that the task of the comprehensive and firmly-established national unity has been achieved and that the democratic national settlement of the Kurdish question has been realized.

 

However this historic achievement is still exposed to cons­piracy. The imperialist forces, the Zionist entity, the Syrian and Libyan regimes, certain forces attached to the Socialist camp, the Iranian regime - all are working, together or separately, to sup­port certain hireling and treacherous forces with a view to destabilizing the northern area. The activities of these forces have escalated under the conditions of the war with the Iranian enemy.

 

In this respect, the Syrian regime has a special role. This du­bious and spiteful regime which is involved in sectarian and di­visive plans in the (Middle East) region has been playing the card of insurgency in the northern part of Iraq since the beginning. Despite its criticism of the Party and Revolution for issuing the Declaration of March 1970 on the pretext that it involved ne­gligence of Iraq's Arabism, this regime had established relations of cooperation with the Barazani’s clique; and its secret service had been supplying this clique with weapons especially during the insurgency between March 1974 and March 1975. After the defeat of the insurgency, the Syrian regime's secret service gave the insurgents full backing, and it is still cooperating with them in full coordination with the Communists, the Al-Da'wa Party bandit and the Iranian regime.

Motivated by its spite against the Party and Revolution and proceeding from its dubious activities, the Libyan regime has also established relations with the puppet and dubious elements who seek to revive insurgency in the north of the country. It has also extended aid and support to these and other hireling ele­ments which are conspiring against the Party and Revolution and against the national unity of Iraq.

 

However, all such attempts are but desperate ones which cannot shake the power of the Party and Revolution. Indeed, all attempts at destabilizing the northern area are nothing but technical attempts isolated from the Kurdish people who de­nounce and violently resist them and rally in a large-scale and profound way round the Party, the Revolution and the Leader (President Saddam Hussein). We are fully confident of the pos­sibility of uprooting these abnormal phenomena and conditions and of moving forward along the path initiated by the Revolu­tion, that of national unity, national fraternity, and the building up of the foundations of peace, stability and progress.

 

4 - The National Progressive Front

The Political Report of the Eighth Regional Congress has tackled the issue of the Progressive Front in historical terms. It explained the historical conditions of this question before the Revolution and the progress of relations after the Revolution between the Party and other parties until the establishment of the Front in July 1973, the declaration of its charter and the for­mation of its bodies in August 1973.

 

The Party has regarded the formation of the Front as an im­portant national achievement and a prominent step along the path of unifying the forces of the people with a view to fulfil­ling the national tasks in a profound and comprehensive man­ner. Moreover, the Party has considered the Front a model that can radiate its positive influence on the movement of Arab re­volution which has long suffered from fragmentation and con­tradiction.

 

In the following years, the Party had exerted great ideolo­gical and political efforts to bring this experiment to success. Since the beginning, the Party has viewed the Front as a force to be added to its own and to that of the Revolution with a view to performing the national tasks. It has also viewed the Front as an open area for interaction of views within the context of unquestionable commitment to the leading role of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party. The Party has openly and clearly asserted that it has alone the right in historical and realistic terms, to lea­ding the revolutionary course in the country because it was the Party which launched the Revolution, made its basic achieve­ments and has the widest popular base. The Party has also stres­sed the need that the parties joining the Front should recognize and deal with this fact in an objective and honest manner.

 

However, the leadership of the Iraqi Communist Party which has agreed to join the Front on the basis of certain rules which were made clear during the open discussions and decla­red stances, and were confirmed by the Charter issued by the Front had not sincerely and objectively adhered to these rules.

 

The Iraqi Communist Party has been characterized by the following basic intermingled aspects which have their own in­ter-related results:

1 - Despite all changes in the world communist movement and the movement of world revolution, the Communist Party in Iraq has remained throughout all its history lacking the sub­jective will. It has never had any independent policy, or stances or initiatives whatever limited they may be.

 

2 - Because of this aspect as well as of the backwardness of the Communist Party's leading bodies, this Party has no origi­nal or creative contribution to realizing and analyzing the basic facts and phenomena characterizing Iraq in particular and the
Arab homeland as a whole. All the Communist Party's analyses of the conditions in Iraq and the Arab homeland and of all local and national issues and problems were therefore a literal trans­lation of the Soviet stances and a poor transcription of traditio­nal Marxist literature despite all essential differences in time and conditions.

This particular aspect has made the Communist Party totally incapable of understanding the nature of the Arab Ba’ath So­cialist Party and its historical role in the movement of Arab re­volution and in Iraq in particular, as well as the significance of the revolutionary progress led by the Party in the country. Every advance made by the Party along the path of revolutionizing the society and performing the national and democratic tasks was causing the Communist Party further confusion and per­plexity in analysis and assessment.

 

Instead of making a genuine and open ideological effort to understand and interact with the actual reality in the country in a sincere and objective manner, the leadership of the Commu­nist Party dealt with this reality in quite a different and un-objective manner. Its attitude was one of envy and complex fee­ling against the Party. Indeed, it had been betting on certain ima­ginary conditions and developments inside the Party. This had made it commit more mistakes in dealing with the Party and Re­volution, and complicated its relations with them.

 

It is only natural that the Ba'ath Party, as any other revolu­tionary Party passing through a process of evolution and ideo­logical, political and organizational maturity as well as through a unique and complex experience in building up a revolutionary government, should suffer from certain internal difficulties and even from malicious internal conspiracies, the last of which was the conspiracy of a treacherous group of leadership members who were discovered in July 1979.

 

There have been many difficulties, complexes and gaps in the constitutional conditions preceding Comrade Saddam Hus­sein's assumption of the forward official responsibility in the Party and Revolution, where the question of leadership had not been clearly settled. The leadership of the Communist Party had imagined that it could take advantage of such conditions and make a bet on imaginary likely developments. However, despite all complex internal conditions, the malicious conspiracies of the treacherous group of some leadership members and the difficul­ties of the previous constitutional formula, the Party remained powerful enough to face those tricks and conspiracies. No one has ever managed to change the basic course of the Revolution which is based on the Party's ideology and basic tendencies.

 

5 - The attitude of the Communist Party in Iraq towards

Arab nationalism, Arab unity and Palestinian cause were characterized by negative-ness because of the two aforementioned factors as well as of the historical background of the Commu­nist Party in Iraq. Since the beginning, this party has laid cer­tain stress on working among the ethnic and religious minori­ties in Iraq in accordance with certain divisive calculations. It has therefore been influenced by the negative atmosphere which had been prevailing among these minorities in the past eras.

Although some aspects of this attitude are related to how the leadership of the Communist Party understands the natio­nal question from the Marxist internationalist point of view, it used to go too far in its negative stance because of its historical background. Therefore, it is quite right to apply Shu'ubism (an­ti-Arab divisive trend) to this leadership.

As for its attitude towards the Palestinian cause, it has al­ways been far away from, and sometimes in conflict with, the nationalist stance. It has even had certain extremely bad at­titudes.

 

This had led to complicating relations between the Party and this leadership which had not made any sincere and profound effort to develop its attitude towards nationalist causes and the Palestinian cause in particular - which is incompatible with the concepts and main aspects of the Charter of the Front in this respect. For the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party, the Arab unity and Palestine causes are not merely political questions. Rather, they are two central issues in its ideology, strategy and daily politi­cal, cultural and information struggle. Hence, the contradiction and disagreement between the Party and the leadership of the Communist Party in political stances and in the relevant prac­tices after the formation of the Front had always caused pro­blems and complicated relations not only on the level of leader­ship but also on that of the rank and file of both parties as well as on the international level.

 

The Communist Party, for instance, used to defy the fee­lings of the people and the Party by establishing relations in pu­blic with the Israeli Communist Party. It also used to publish cables sent to it from that party in its public papers in Iraq.

The formula of the Progressive Front had been more advanced and open than similar ones in other countries of the re­gion. The Communist Party had enjoyed full freedom in poli­tical and organizational activity and in foreign relations, and its newspapers were independent and not subject to any form of censorship. However, the leadership of the Communist Party had not viewed such a formula as an outcome of the sound de­mocratic attitude of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party towards the Front and its true desire to build up a distinguished democratic Front experiment. Rather, it had exploited the Front in an op­portunistic manner contradictory to the Front's concepts and relations.

 

The Communist Party's activity among the people and the trends of its newspapers had not shown any interest in defend­ing the revolutionary government and protecting the great re­volutionary gains which it had achieved. Rarely had the Com­munist Party viewed the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party and the July 17-30 Revolution and its achievements and leadership in posi­tive terms corresponding to the objective reality. Rather, the Communist Party's activity and its newspapers' trends were fo­cusing on negative aspects and mistakes which are a normal phe­nomenon in a great revolutionary process. In so doing, they were not aiming at treating these aspects, but at making disho­nest gains at the expense of the Party and Revolution.

 

For many years, the Party leadership had been warning the leadership of the Communist Party of this approach which is contradictory to the Front concepts and the mutual commit­ments within the Front. It is quite illogical that the Communist Party is a participant in the Front and the Cabinet, enjoying all rights and privileges of any legal party participating in the Front and Cabinet, while at the same time it deals with the Govern­ment as if it is an opposition party fishing for negative aspects and mistakes.

 

The Party was eager to warn the Communist Party of these practices in a manner consistent with principles and morality, with a view to preserving Front relations and traditions and bringing this experiment to success.

In a general meeting of the Front Committees in the whole country in August 1976, Comrade Saddam Hussein tackled this issue with precision, clarity and openness.

His talk, which was published in "One Trench or Two?" is a historic document insofar as the development of relations be­tween the Party and Revolution on one hand and the Iraqi Com­munist Party on the other is concerned.

 

Comrade Saddam Hussein said: "According to our infor­mation, some brothers, especially from the Communist Party, still feel embarrassed when asked: "Are you with the Govern­ment or not? Are you with the Revolution or not?" Is it embarrassing for one to side with the great Revolution and its Go­vernment? The Revolution is cherished by every honest patriot; and its major achievements are obvious to all. If there is to be any speculation about whether one is for or against the Revo­lution, it should be in the context of final results, not that of de­tails which could be criticized in a democratic and objective manner.

We should all criticize flawed details, but errors in details should not bring us into psychological opposition with the Re­volution and its Government. At the same time, however, the errors of the administration should be neither a means nor a jus­tification for pursuing Party gains. The basic justification for these should be our ideology as we expound it and interact with the people through it.

 

The Communist Party believe in a line ideologically inde­pendent from that of the Ba'ath Party. The same is true of the Kurdish Democratic Party and the others. Only along such a line, should they try to make party gains, since any other way would be bound to lead to contradictions among the various na­tional forces or even to deviation if it came into conflict with the revolutionary process. Suppose we, the Ba'athist, reversed the case and started attacking the Communists in our speeches and through our media, saying that they are attacking our system and principles. They would regard these as improper uses of the administrative apparatus and would try to make use of that to their own advantage. What do you imagine would happen? Is such a state of affairs acceptable? If it is, you can imagine how much you would lose if the leaders of the Ba’ath Party were to inform the people in their speeches of the negative aspects of the Communist Party. We say this, not out of vanity, but rather out of conviction that our relationship with the people is based on positive interaction and mutual trust. That is why they would listen to our words.

So when, instead, we speak positively of the Front, of your role in it, and of the role of the other national forces, this is very much to your advantage.

 

This principled and practical talk which expresses a pro­found desire to build up solid front relations and to proceed along the path of the Front would have been an excellent pro­gram of relations between the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party and the Communist Party along the path of performing the national tasks on local and Arab levels, had the Communist Party's lea­dership acted with sincerity towards such relations under the Re­volution with a view to discharging the tasks defined by the Charter of National Action.

 

However, the Communist Party's leadership acted in a con­trary manner to the line defined by Comrade Saddam Hussein.

Persisting in following such a policy, the Communist Party continued its campaign of slander, distortion and subversion against the revolutionary course, through its public press and all other possible means. The Communist Party also maintained its emergency formulas holding its central conferences secretly, which underlines its bad intentions against the Party and Revolution.

 

The subversive trends of the Communist Party's leadership had clearly surfaced in its attitude towards the Kurdish ques­tion. After the defeat of Barazani's clique and the presence of well-grounded objective chances for cementing the peaceful de­mocratic settlement of the Kurdish question, enhancing security and stability in the region and consolidating national unity, the Communist Party's papers and organizations in the northern part of the country laid great stress on promoting isolationism, preaching conflict between Arab nationalism and Kurdish na­tionalism and reviving all chauvinistic trends among Kurds. If we go back to the Communist Party's literature at the time and strip it of its Communist posture it would not have been diffe­rent from that of Barazani's clique. Such an attitude on the part of the Communist Party's leadership implied a contradiction on one hand and a negative attitude towards the Party and Revo­lution and towards national unity on the other.

 

The contradiction in the Communist Party's stance is that where it concerns Arab nationalism it is internationalist or even anti-nationalist, tending to deny Arab nationalism its own cha­racteristics. But, where it concerns Kurdish nationalism and other ethnic minorities and particularities in Iraq, it is so natio­nalist that it even tends to take chauvinistic stances and stir eth­nic conflicts along lines of contradiction, conflict and division. It had become quite clear that the leadership of the Com­munist Party which had found that the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party had decisively become the vanguard and popular force among the Arab people in Iraq had planned to become an al­ternative to the Barazani's leadership in the northern region. It had tried, sometimes through insinuation, sometimes through public statements to make a deal with the leadership of the Party and Revolution, where the (Arab) part of Iraq would be under the leadership of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party and the (Kur­dish) part of Iraq subject to the influence of the Communist Party, thus dividing Iraq.

 

It was, however, quite strange that the leadership of the Communist Party should forget that Barazani's leadership itself had earlier followed the same line and tried by all possible means to make such a deal with the leadership of the Party and Revo­lution in the difficult conditions facing the Revolution in its early years. This leadership also ignored the fact that the Leadership of the Party and Revolution had rejected such a divisive antinational policy under the most difficult and complex circumstan­ces where the gravest threat to the Party's government was po­sed, asserting the motto of one Iraq, under one national leader­ship with one national policy. Indeed, it has launched a fierce political and military battle against this dubious divisive trend, where the greatest sacrifices were made in order to cement na­tional unity and prevent any form of separation.

In line with such a policy, and from a chauvinistic point of view, the Communist Party started a large-scale activity among Kurds with a view to checking the spread of the Arab Ba'ath So­cialist Party organization there as we had previously mentioned in reviewing the Kurdish question.

 

The Communist Party's leadership has even established re­lations with the new shady subversive bands which were form­ed inside and outside Iraq after the collapse of Barazani's clique. All this was a clear indicator that the Communist Party's lea­dership was aiming at withholding the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question and keeping it suspended. This was not only a mistaken or negative attitude but also one which poses a serious threat to national unity and independen­ce. Moreover, the Communist Party's press had launched organized campaigns with no national justification whatsoever against non-Communist countries with which the Revolution was seeking to establish relations of friendship and cooperation in the national interest, on both local and Arab levels.

 

During official visits exchanged between officials of Iraq and those countries, the Communist Party's press was deliberately launching campaigns against those states so as to distort the aims of the Revolution's policy and to undermine relations with those countries. If, for instance, one of the Revolution's leaders visit­ed France, the Communist party's press would deliberately launch a violent attack, unjustified in national terms, against the French Government for its policy at home or in other parts of the world.

 

One essential point agreed upon with the Iraqi Communist Party at the formation of the Front was the prohibition of any form of political organization and activity in the army and Arm­ed Forces by any political party or movement except the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party. Before the inception of the Front, there had been a law promulgated on November 11, 1971 dealing in a clear-cut manner with this issue. This law had been since valid. However, the Iraqi Communist Party had done its best to outmaneuver this agreement after the formation of the Front, and continued its organizational activity inside the Armed For­ces. Whenever parts of such an activity were discovered, the Communist Party leadership tried under various pretexts to save the perpetrators from punishment or to modify it.

 

Despite the fact that the Party and Revolution's leadership was extremely strict in implementing this law, certain compli­cations took place in its implementation because of the Party's desire to maintain Front relations and to avoid punishing the perpetrators in cases where no bad intention was found.

 

However, there were many indications that the Communist Party's leadership was trying by means of such methods to tame the leadership of the Party and Revolution so that in the end it would allow as a de facto matter the Communist activity inside the armed forces.

 

Because of a mistake committed by one of the official bo­dies concerned, the implementation of death sentences on Com­munists who were convicted of organizational activity inside the Armed Forces was postponed for a long time. Hence, the num­ber of those convicted rose to thirty-one.

 

When the Leadership realized this point, it ordered the im­plementation of death sentences on a group of them. The Com­munist Party's leadership tried to exert pressure with all means with a view to halting the implementation of death sentences on the remainder of criminals. It had made certain Communist countries' leaders send letters to the Leadership requesting non-implementation of death sentences.

 

Hence, the leadership of the Communist Party had revealed its entire plan and also its attempts to seek the help of certain fo­reign countries with whom Iraq was eager to maintain relations of friendship and cooperation. In so doing, this leadership was aiming at imposing a fait accompli in Iraq's internal affairs in­compatible with its sovereignty and basic interests as well as with the basis of the Front.

 

The reply of the Party and Revolution's Leadership was clear-cut and strict. Letters were sent to those leaders of foreign states unequivocally rejecting any form of interference in Iraq's internal affairs, and asserting that the Revolution was determined to apply the law on whoever may try to break it.

 

The failure of all the policies and maneuvers of the Iraqi Communist Party's leadership, the diminution of the influence of the Communist Party among the people and the expansion and consolidation of the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party's influence and social, progressive and democratic achievements - all have brought the Communist Party's leadership to a crossroads: ei­ther to be under the Revolution's banner and be committed to the rules of the Progressive Front and to serving the national in­terests on local and Arab levels, or to move away from the Re­volution and engage in a desperate venture against it. The lea­dership of the Communist Party opted for the second al­ternative.

 

This leadership was driven to such a deadlock by its own ideological and political backwardness, the failure of its policies and maneuvers, the diminution of its influence among the people and its total dependence. The leaders of the Iraqi Com­munist Party left for Moscow and other communist capitals one after another, despite the fact that no prosecution measures whatsoever were taken against them. They formed an Iraqi Communist community abroad and started to mount propagan­da campaigns against the Party and Revolution in cooperation with all enemies despite their ideological and political dif­ferences.

 

As an expression of the desire of the Party's leadership to maintain the Front program and despite all the Communist Party's hostile attitudes to the Revolution, the national unity and the basic interests of the country, the Leadership called for a dialogue on the main issues in the relations between the two parties. This was conveyed to the Communist Party's represen­tative in the Cabinet by Comrade Saddam Hussein himself. How­ever, the Communist Party's leadership, whose assessments were always shortsighted and erroneous, imagined that this sincere national appeal was motivated by a certain crisis confronting the Party and Revolution. Hence, it made a condition - which can be rightly and objectively called a foolish one- that the dia­logue between the two parties should be held abroad.

 

The Communist Party's representative in the Cabinet was thus told that those who made such conditions were obviously unwilling to go back to the Front and to the country.

Thus relations with the Communist Party's leadership had come to an end. Its representatives in the Cabinet were both re­lieved of their posts.

 

The hostile attitude of the Communist Party's leadership to­wards the homeland and the people was confirmed during the battle against the Iranian enemy. This leadership had ignored all national considerations which are above differences and even po­litical conflicts of a domestic nature, when it shamefully allied itself with the Iranian enemy, the enemy of the homeland, the people and the Armed Forces, and with the enemy's local sto­oges. Hence it had deserved total national condemnation.

 

The course of the National Front which was established on the basis of sincerity to the homeland and the Revolution had not come to a halt with the Communist Party's departure from the Front. Rather, it has moved along its normal course dischar­ging its task in embracing all sincere patriots in the context of uni­fied action to serve the homeland and deepen the course of the Revolution.

 

6 - Democratic Transformations

The Political Report of the Eighth Regional Congress sum­med up the Party and Revolution's activity in the field of de­mocratic transformations in the past period in seeking to "lay the foundations of popular democracy and apply its formulas which are compatible with the objective conditions of the Party and Revolution." 

It has also defined a central task for the next phase, namely "the completion of the requirements and bodies of popular de­mocracy" and listed the following targets:

1 - To set up the National Assembly in a transitional form.

 

2 - To define the theoretical, political and legislative criteria governing people's councils and ensure the leadership of expert cadres; to give the councils the care and attention they deserve as new institutions of the revolutionary society and as one of the bases of popular democracy.

 

3 - To allow the press and unions greater scope for criticism in order to promote discussion and dialogue on fundamental questions interesting the citizens; to extend participation in such discussions, at all times and by all means, so that solutions may
be found.

 

4 - Throughout the coming stage and once conditions are right, to strive to supply the remaining bases of the popular democracy, by deciding the country's permanent constitution, hol­ding general elections to the National Assembly, and establish­ing representation in the people's councils on the basis of election 5.

 

The Report has also asserted that "the new phase demands a thorough ideological work, if the problems of establishing a popular democracy are to be solved."6

What then, has the Party and Revolution achieved in the field of democratic transformations in the period between the Eighth Regional Congress and this Congress?

The democratic question is one of the most complex issues in the Third World countries which have not seen a constant and steady growth during past centuries, and which have all way through suffered from colonial hegemony and monopolistic plunder.

 

As part of the Third World, Iraq cannot treat this issue with­out considering this fact. The Eighth Congress Political Re­port has precisely referred to a significant fact distinguishing Iraq from other Arab countries when it said: «Of all the Arab coun­tries perhaps, Iraq was least experienced in the practice and tra­dition of democracy, with or without social content. From the days of the Ottoman Empire until July 1968, it had suffered one autocratic and arbitrary regime after another, with only brief in­tervals in which the people and progressive forces enjoyed any measure of freedom of thought, of the press, of political party and trade union activity, or could engage in parliamentary work. »

In the light of this, it would not be possible to compare the progress made by the Revolution in this field with that it made in other fields where the revolutionary will can make achieve­ments more quickly.

In the past phase, the Revolution managed to develop the democratic practice in the revolutionary society, but it could not achieve a rapid rate of progress corresponding to the aspirations and aims defined by the Eighth Congress.

 

Some of the objectives laid down by this Congress were not achieved from certain reasons which we shall later tackle, while the central objective of holding general elections for the Natio­nal Assembly was realized in June 1980. There were objective and subjective reasons. When the Eighth Regional Congress was held, the insurgency staged by Barazani's clique had not yet star-led. The National and Progressive Front were still young.

The most important factors which had their bearing on the rate of democratic transformations, especially in the field of es­tablishing democratic institutions like the National Assembly, were:

(a) the conditions in the northern region during and after the insurgency;

(b) the relations with the Communist Party; and

(c) the Arab conditions in the aftermath of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the Camp David Accords.

 

The Party's principled stance throughout the course of the Revolution since July 17-30 has been to give every formula of popular democracy a real chance of practice and development and to reject the application of formal and superficial methods mi-rely for pretentious reasons. For the Party, what basically matters is the people's confidence in and respect for the institu­tions and formulas which the Party and Revolution apply, as well as the people's belief in the originality of the Leadership's measures and decisions.

If the Party finds that a certain democratic formula is incompatible with the circumstances it will openly reject it and will not resort instead to superficial formulas through coercion or deception.

 

It is essential to refer here to an important question in the thinking of the Party's Leadership in the period between the Eighth Congress and the decision to hold general elections for the National Assembly. A formula for establishing a National Assembly by nomination was approved. This was confirmed in die Provisional Constitution and was listed among the objectives assigned by the Eighth Congress for the following phase in the held of democratic transformations.

 

However, the Leadership hesitated to implement this for­mula; not because it was unable to do so, for such a formula is (I u he easy to implement. Rather, the reason is in its opinion, that this formula would not be of real importance in developing democratic practice in the revolutionary society and that the people would regard it as an artificial thing with no ingredients of genuine life. Hence, the Leadership preferred not to apply it, and to wait, instead, for proper conditions to establish through elections a National Assembly with the ingredients of genuine life and the actual ability to develop democratic practice in the revolutionary society.

How were the three afore-mentioned factors affected by the process of democratic transformations?

 

a) The Conditions in the North of the Country

Any institutions established to develop the democratic prac­tice in the country, namely the National Assembly has obvious­ly to be of comprehensive national nature. Any abnormal con­ditions in an important part of the country would certainly have its bearing upon the conditions of the whole country.

During the insurgency, which had started within weeks af­ter the end of the Eighth Congress, it had not been possible to hold real democratic elections in the northern part of the country. After defeating the insurgency, the Revolution had to make large-scale efforts for a long time to face the serious and complex consequences of the insurgency as well as the whole odd conditions which had long existed in the northern area.

There had been wounds, suffering, complications and mis­understanding which had to be treated with a view to creating a healthy national atmosphere in this region. The Revolution had also to make a lot of development achievements in this re­gion in order to realize a state of parity between the benefits re­ceived by the citizens living in other parts of the country through the Revolution's, economic, social and cultural achievements on one hand, and that of the majority of citizens in this region on the other.

 

b) Relations with the Iraqi Communist Party

The Revolution's attitude towards establishing the desired democratic institutions cannot be affected by the attitude of this or that party towards the Revolution or the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party.

However, relations between the Party and those parties can­not but affect the pace of establishing such institutions.

When relations are normal, such institutions can be easily es­tablished if there is a conviction of the need for doing so.

As we said in the last chapter, relations with the Commu­nist Party's leadership were unstable. With such unstable rela­tions, it was not possible to organize democratic institutions when the roles and aims of each participant party were not known. Frankly speaking, it was not right at all to give the Com­munist Party leadership a new forum that it could use under the Front's cover to stage distortion campaigns against the Party and Revolution and to implement foreign strategies. Hence, the de­lay in establishing the National Assembly was in part caused by this factor.

 

c) Arab Conditions

The phase between the Eighth Congress and this Congress was characterized by a rush of so serious events in the Arab re­gion, that the Leadership of the Party and Revolution was large­ly preoccupied with them at the expense of many local tasks, such as democratic transformations.

 

In the year following the Eighth Regional Congress the si­tuation in Lebanon exploded, drawing much of the Leadership's attention. In 1977, Sadat made his ominous visit to Jerusalem. Since then, and for two years, the Leadership had been largely preoccupied with Arab conditions. For many months after this visit, there were intensive arguments and large-scale contacts over the best national formula for confrontation.

 

After the conclusion of the Camp David Accords, the Lea­dership called for an Arab summit conference in Baghdad. Then a Charter for National Action was concluded with the Syrian re­gime. The Leadership had made intensive efforts in these fields of national action. Relations with Syria after the conclusion of the Charter had taken a great part of the theoretic, practical and political activity of the Leadership.

 

Despite the fact that Arab conditions cannot justify the de­lay in building up democratic institutions, this point should be viewed realistically. When the Leadership of the Party and Re­volution and all leading bodies were preoccupied with many complex nationalist (Arab) tasks, there was not enough time for carving new formulas for the democratic practice which certain­ly demands great theoretical, political and practical efforts.

However, the subjective or internal reasons for delaying the provision of all the requirements and institutions of popular de­mocracy in the past phase are no less important than the objec­tive or external reasons.

 

What are these subjective reasons? And how had they re­flected on the course of democratic transformations in the revo­lutionary society?

Ever since the beginning, the Party had opted for the prin­ciples of popular democracy as an approach to democracy, that is, it has rejected the liberal approach to democracy which was brought about by capitalist experiments in Western Europe and America. It has also rejected the Communist approach known as "proletariat dictatorship."

 

However, the belief in popular democracy as a special ap­proach demanded that the Party should formulate its own ex­periment and its own view in this field in exactly the same man­ner as it did in the field of socialist transformations.

On the other hand, it was not possible to expand democra­tic practices and formulas without corresponding favorable subjective or internal conditions in the Party and Revolution.

 

The Party has decisively undertaken the task of consolidat­ing the revolutionary government and had rightly given priority to this task over any other consideration.

The phase preceding the Eighth Regional Congress had been characterized as a phase of consolidating the revolutionary go­vernment and uprooting any possibility of conspiracy or apostasy. But this task had not ended with the conclusion of that Congress. Despite the fact that the revolutionary government had then become firmly consolidated, it was still exposed to se­rious threats. The situation in the north of the country, the ne­gative policies of the Communist Party which had developed into enmity and the emergence of the politico-religious pheno­menon in a hostile form-all were posing a considerable challenge to the Party and Revolution.

 

The Eighth Congress Political Report has stressed the need to restore the balance between centralism and democracy in ac­tion whether in the Party, in the government, or in the unions, as well as in society as a whole, by employing gradual and firm methods. At the same time, the Report said that the emergency methods, which we have to drop in all fields insofar as the cir­cumstances permit, may sometimes be greatly needed to deal with a new situation.

 

In the light of this assessment and the objective conditions of the Party, and because of certain conditions inside the Party, including the past constitutional formula, the Leadership had not been enthusiastic about striking a balance corresponding with the circumstances between centralism and democracy, with a view to expanding and developing democratic practice and es­tablishing relevant institutions. Rather, there has been certain ap­prehension that any expansion in democratic institutions may be exploited to inflict harm on, and eventually weaken the Party and Revolution.

During this stage, Comrade Saddam Hussein made great ef­forts to develop democratic concepts and practices in the Lea­dership and among Party cadres as well as in the Party, Govern­ment and unions.

 

Comrade Saddam Hussein has criticized the trends which unjustifiably tended to impose arbitrary centralized formulas in directing the Party, Government and unions and in dealing with the people. He called for open dealings with the people and for facilitating the choice of leading bodies in the unions.

As for the formula of the people's councils and the relevant tasks assigned by the Eighth Congress, we have to say that this formula was not developed, and that the Leadership had not ta­ken enough care to develop it.

 

The People's Councils' formula had come at a time when the Revolution was living under exceptional conditions which are mentioned in the Political Report of the Eighth Congress. These councils were formed by nomination. Although their presence in such a form was better than their absence, practical ex­perience has proved that such formulas cannot develop unless they genuinely emerge from among the people themselves.

 

However, it was not possible in practical and principled terms to establish People's Councils by election before esta­blishing the National Assembly in such a manner.

In 1978, the Leadership ordered that a study on establish­ing the National Council and the People's Councils and on the democratic management of the State should be prepared. How­ever, the study - which a member of the leadership who was later convicted as conspirator was commissioned to prepare - was deliberately delayed for a long time. Then it was presented to the Leadership which found it so complicated and full of mis­takes that it decided to review it again.

 

After the assumption by Comrade Saddam Hussein of the direct responsibility of leadership in the Party and State, the Lea­dership decided to go ahead with elections for the National As­sembly and to study the formula of people's councils after the forming of the National Assembly. The next phase demands a fresh study of the formula of the people's councils. Their future and role in the democratic practice in the country have to be determined.

 

As for the unions, their role in society had been enhanced with the progress of the course of the Revolution and with the economic, social and cultural transformations. These organizations have become firmly established as social institutions with a great moral and material influence on the political and social life of the country. Millions of workers, farmers, women, stu­dents, youth and others work within the framework of these organizations and practice their democratic rights through elec­tions, thus effectively contributing to the building up and deve­lopment of the new society. With the establishment of the Na­tional Assembly as one of the main institutions of people's de­mocracy, it is necessary not to underestimate the role of unions in the democratic process in the revolutionary society. These organizations would remain and even play an effective role in this process and in the course of development, socialist transforma­tions and all other revolutionary transformations. In the past phase, there had been a certain progress in the role which the Party Press, the official press and that of the unions had ear played before the Eighth Congress in criticizing erroneous practices by governmental bodies, expressing the needs of the people and contributing to the argument on the basic national questions. Such a role had been appreciated by the Eighth Cong: itself.

 

The bureaucratic trends which tended to check the role of the press in the democratic process - which the Political Ref of Eighth Congress had criticized - had not disappeared in following phase. However, the role of the press had become more established with the legitimacy given to it by the Eighth Congress and the close attention paid to it by the Leaders!

 

Of particular significance here is Comrade Saddam Hussein’s close attention to this role and his efforts to develop. Indeed, he has even sometimes personally criticized bureaucratic practices and ensuing ills.

 

The Leadership made an important step along the democratic path and along that of building up a new state when it decided that draft laws and systems should be discussed by unions concerned before being presented to the Revolution Command Council. Moreover, the Leadership took an important initiative in inviting those concerned with new laws systems to attend the National Assembly sessions devotee discussion of such laws. Another one was to prepare working papers in studying important issues with the participation of those concerned in their discussions.

 

6 - The National Assembly

Establishing the National Assembly was one of the b achievements of the Revolution in the field of democratic transformations. The National Assembly experiment was characterizing by originality and innovation.

 

As we have explained about the Revolution's method of sincerely dealing with the people and in meeting all its prom and commitments, the National Assembly had not been established on traditional or artificial bases.

 

With its vast popular support, and effective means in the State, unions and media, the Party could have entered a traditional parliamentary election experiment and easily win a vast majori­ty in the Assembly. But the Party opted for another path, that of sincerity and originality.

 

The number of Party members and independent figures who are loyal to the Revolution, who put up as candidates for the membership of the National Assembly, was more than the num­ber of seats for each constituency. All citizens were allowed to stand for election.

Prevented from standing for election were Communist Party members because of their treachery against the homeland, the people and the Revolution as we have explained; members of puppet and hostile political groups; former members of Parlia­ment during the reactionary royal regime; and those convicted of treason, espionage, dubious connections with foreign bodies and disgraceful crimes.

 

These restrictions which were necessary to protect the first experiment of parliamentary elections in the country since the 1958 July Revolution had not diminished competition.  On the contrary, competition was so intensive that 840 candidates con­tested for 250 seats of the Assembly. Candidates were given equal opportunities in publicity, whose cost was met by the State. The Leadership had not allowed any privileges to the Party members or even the Party Command members standing for election. It prevented the Party organizations and unions from doing anything to the advantage of any candidate. It had also prevented State organs from interfering in the elections and stressed that their activity should be confined to discharging their tasks which were defined by the National Assembly Law.

 

The people's participation in the elections was large and re­markable. The rate of participation in the elections was very high, despite the fact that this was the first experiment of elec­tions, indeed the first real experiment, for more than twenty years; that it was very hot on the Election Day and that certain puppet forces threatened to attack polling centers in the Auto­nomy Region.

 

The elections had confirmed the soundness of the Leadership's approach to preparing the elections. Sincerity and good faith in dealing with the people; and considering every candi­date as a candidate of the Revolution as long as he committed himself to its main policies and served it and its achievements regardless of his Party affiliation - all this enhanced the confi­dence of the people in the Party and their support for it.

 

The majority of candidates were chosen from among Party members. As for independent candidates, they were chosen from among those with best record of struggle.

 

The National Assembly elections of June 1980 were rightly considered a popular referendum through which the people in Iraq expressed their profound and genuine support for the Party and Revolution and leader Saddam Hussein.

 

The election process, of course, was not without drawbacks and erroneous practices. In the opening session on June 30, 1980, Comrade Saddam Hussein referred to this frankly, and cast light on mistakes and drawbacks, calling for correcting them and avoiding similar mistakes in the future.

 

However, such negative aspects and mistakes cannot detract from the democratic value of this experiment and from its re­markable consequences on the relation between the Party and Revolution and the people.

 

In the past phase, the National Assembly started its tasks in accordance with the law.  Despite the fact that the Assembly's experiment is young, lacking the necessary traditions, and that its practice of its tasks coincided with the start of the war with Iran, it has made active and earnest efforts along the path of de­mocratic practice in a manner consolidating the democratic and popular course in the Revolution's society.

 

Fully supported by the Party's Leadership and the Com­rade Regional Secretary, President of the Republic, the Assem­bly Members have to expand and deepen their activity within the democratic process and develop their effective contribution to the process of revolutionary construction in accordance with the Assembly's tasks and powers which were defined by its law.

 

Despite the conditions of war with Iran, the Revolution had fulfilled its promise of establishing the Legislative Council of the Autonomy Region through election on September 19, 1980. On this day, the first Legislative Council was elected. Since the Au­tonomy Law was issued on March 11, 1974, the Legislative Council had been formed through nomination.

 

Similarly to the National Assembly elections, the Legisla­tive Council elections were characterized by democratic and free aspects, equality of opportunities for all candidates and large and genuine popular participation. The results of these elections were also another referendum on the connection of the Region's people with the Party and Revolution and the Leader Saddam Hussein, and a referendum on the Revolution's policy in solv­ing the Kurdish question in a sound national and democratic manner.

In reviewing the democratic experiment in the country, it is quite necessary to refer to the special role of Comrade Saddam Hussein in this process especially since assuming the forward of­ficial responsibility in the Leadership of the Party and Revolu­tion. Besides his role in developing the democratic practice in the country through his responsibilities at the head of Party and State institutions, he himself has initiated profound, living and genuine relations with the people. Comrade Saddam Hussein al­lows every citizen to contact him by telephone, receives scores of citizens every week to be acquainted with their problems, vi­sits every corner in Iraq, acquaints himself with the citizens' liv­ing conditions, asks them about their problems, discusses with them their views of public affairs, and acquaints himself with the way the Party and State bodies as well as unions work.

 

This method of direct and living contact with the people cannot be listed within any contemporary method of democracy. It is a method initiated by Comrade Saddam Hussein himself and genuinely connected with his character and his close rela­tion with the people. In some of its aspects, it is similar to the methods of early Moslem Arab leaders in communicating with the people and getting acquainted with their conditions.  Of course, there is a difference in the size and nature of society be­tween theirs and the complicated society in this age.

 

Comrade Saddam Hussein's own method in his relation with the people, in getting acquainted with their conditions and problems and in making living interaction with them, adds a profound and human dimension to the democratic practice in the society built up by the Party in Iraq. Moreover, it helps the Lea­der and the Leadership to see for themselves the difficulties and conditions which the Party and official bodies may fail to realize and treat.

 

Through this method, many economic, social and adminis­trative conditions have been reviewed; and many laws and mea­sures of social, economic and administrative nature closely con­nected with the people's life and their living and social condi­tions formulated or modified or developed.

 

Leader Saddam Hussein's distinctive method gives the lead to every official in the Party and State to follow in the living and direct dealings with the people.

Such a method objectively ensures that Party and State bo­dies and even unions will not stagnate. It also protects them from the diseases of withdrawing into oneself, bureaucracy and erroneous generalizations. Indeed, this method continuously gives these organs a fresh blood and a new spirit in order to be acquainted with the people's conditions and to serve them in the best manner.

 

Notes

1 - The 1968 Revolution in Iraq, Experience and Prospects, The Political Report of the Eighth Regional Congress of the Arab Baath Socialist Party.1974 published by Ithaca Press, London 1979-p 158.

2 - Saddam Hussein, "One Trench or Two", published by Dar al-Ma'mun, Bagh­dad, p. 30-31.

3 - Ali Beg Pass is considered to be the most strategic natural borders, not only in Iraq but in the entire World. This Pass has witnessed many fierce battles. The liberation of the pass by the Iraqi Army in a battle for its courage and brilliance led to the defeat of the renegade faction in 1975.

4 - Saddam Hussein "One Trench or Two" pp 38-39.

5 - The 1968 Revolution in Iraq. p. 60.

6 - Ibid., p.160.

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